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Quantum cryptographic protocols are typically analysed by assuming that potential opponents
can carry out all physical operations, an assumption which grants capabilities far in excess of present
technology. Adjusting this assumption to reflect more realistic capabilities is an attractive prospect,
but one that can only be justified with a rigorous, quantitative framework that relates adversarial
restrictions to the protocols security and performance. We investigate the effect of limitations on
the eavesdropper’s (Eve’s) ability to make a coherent attack on the security of continuous-variable
quantum key distribution (CV-QKD). We consider a realistic attack, in which the total decoherence
induced during the attack is modelled by a Gaussian channel. Based on our decoherence model we
propose an optimal hybrid attack, which allows Eve to perform a combination of both coherent and
individual attacks simultaneously. We evaluate the asymptotic and composable finite-size security
of a heterodyne CV-QKD protocol against such hybrid attacks in terms of Eve’s decoherence. We
show that when the decoherence is greater than a threshold value, Eve’s most effective strategy is
reduced to the individual attack. Thus, if we are willing to assume that the decoherence caused by
the memory and the collective measurement is large enough, it is sufficient to analyse the security of
the protocol only against individual attacks, which significantly improves the CV-QKD performance
in terms of both the key rate and the maximum secure transmission distance.
Coherent attacks are known to be the most power-
ful evesdropping attacks on quantum key distribution
(QKD) protocols. The evesdropper, Eve, prepares a
global ancillary system, interacting collectively with all
the quantum states sent through the channel, with the
entire output ancillae stored into a quantum memory,
and a collective measurement applied over the stored en-
semble [1, 2] to extract the maximum information on the
key. Making such an attack, particularly on a continuous-
variable (CV) QKD system [1–3] represents an extreme
technical challenge for Eve.
For a no-switching CV-QKD protocol [4, 5], based on
Gaussian-modulated coherent states and heterodyne de-
tection, the finite-size composable security against co-
herent attacks can be analysed by considering Gaussian
collective attacks [6]. In a collective attack Eve pre-
pares an ensemble of independent and identical quantum
systems, each one interacting individually with a single
quantum state transmitted through the channel, with the
output ancilla stored into a quantum memory [1, 2]. In a
collective attack on Gaussian-modulated coherent-state
CV-QKD protocol the ancillae stored in Eve’s quantum
memory is a tensor product of n coherent states, i.e.,
an n-symbol codeword. In order for Eve to extract the
maximum information upper bounded by the Holevo in-
formation [7–9] a sequence of projective binary-outcome
collective quantum measurements has to be applied to
the n-symbol codeword [10]. In [11] a quantum optical
realization of the sequential decoding strategy has been
provided, which in a large number of 2nR steps deter-
mines which codeword was sent (with R the rate in bit-
s/symbol being bounded by the the Holevo information).
In [12] a more efficient (in terms of scaling) sequential
decoding strategy (but with no evidence of quantum op-
tical implementation) has been proposed, consisting of
a sequence of complex adaptive collective quantum mea-
surements performed in a series of nR concatenated steps
to determine which codeword was sent. Thus, in a realis-
tic collective attack a significant amount of time and/or
coherent operations are required for Eve to collectively
decode the stored ensemble to approach the Holevo in-
formation.
In this work we investigate Eve’s optimal attack in a
no-switching CV-QKD protocol, given practical restric-
tions on her storage and processing ability. The realis-
tic assumption of restricted quantum memories has been
studied in the context of quantum data-locking protocols
[13–16], and two-party cryptographic tasks of oblivious
transfer and bit commitment [17–21]. In a no-switching
CV-QKD protocol Eve can avoid the decoherence in-
duced over the storage and processing time of the col-
lective attack by performing individual attacks, where
she interacts individually with each quantum state sent
by Alice, and she immediately performs an individual
measurement on the output ancilla. This is an optimal
individual attack strategy because there is no basis in-
formation withheld in the no-switching protocol. With
the aim of allowing Eve to simultaneously benefit from
both the collective decoding and avoiding the decoher-
ence induced over the decoding, we will propose a new
2class of optimal attacks, hybrid attacks, that lie in be-
tween the coherent and individual attacks. In the hybrid
attack we model the total decoherence induced on each
quantum system stored into the quantum memory with
a thermal, lossy Gaussian channel. We will evaluate the
asymptotic and composable finite-size security of a no-
switching CV-QKD protocol in terms of Eve’s attack de-
coherence, thereby demonstrating that if the decoherence
is higher than a threshold value, Eve’s best strategy is the
individual attack, and thus the security of the CV-QKD
protocol can be analysed by considering only the indi-
vidual attack, which remarkably improves both the key
rate and the maximum secure transmission distance of
the protocol. Note that our realistic assumption of deco-
herence over the storage time of a collective (or coherent)
attack is fully future proof, in the sense that if a perfect
quantum memory becomes possible in the future, the key
which is secure now will remain secure.
CV-QKD system. We consider a Gaussian no-
switching CV-QKD protocol [4, 5], where Alice generates
a pair of random real numbers, chosen from two indepen-
dent Gaussian distributions of variance VA, to prepare
coherent states. The prepared states are then transmit-
ted over an insecure quantum channel with transmissiv-
ity T and excess noise ξ (relative to the input of the
quantum channel) to Bob. For each incoming state, Bob
uses heterodyne detection to measure both the qˆ and
pˆ quadratures. In this protocol, sifting is not needed,
since both of the random variables generated by Alice are
used for the generation of the key. When the quantum
communication is finished and all the incoming quantum
states are measured by Bob, classical post-processing in-
cluding discretization, parameter estimation, error cor-
rection, and privacy amplification over a public but au-
thenticated classical channel is commenced to produce a
shared secret key.
This Gaussian CV-QKD system can also be rep-
resented by an equivalent entanglement-based scheme
[1, 2], where Alice generates a two-mode squeezed vac-
uum (TMSV) state ρAB with the quadrature variance
V=VA+1. Alice retains mode A, while sending mode B
to Bob over the quantum channel. In the entanglement-
based scheme, Alice applies a heterodyne detection to
mode A, which results in projecting the mode B onto a
coherent state. At the output of the channel, Bob ap-
plies a heterodyne detection to the received mode B1,
with his detector having an efficiency of η and electronic
noise variance of υel [22, 23].
Composable finite-size security analysis. We exploit
the approach introduced in [6, 24] to analyse the com-
posable finite-size security of the no-switching CV-QKD
protocol (acting on 2n-mode state shared between Al-
ice and Bob) against coherent attacks. This approach
consists of two steps; first proving the security of the
protocol against Gaussian collective attacks with a se-
curity parameter ǫ [24], and then applying the Gaussian
de Finetti reduction [6] to obtain the security against
coherent attacks with a polynomially larger security pa-
rameter ǫ˜ [6], where the security loss due to the reduc-
tion from coherent attacks to collective attacks scales like
O(n4) (see Appendix. A for more details). There exists
another approach to prove the security against coherent
attacks which is based on an entropic uncertainty rela-
tion [25–27], but the relevant CV-QKD protocol requires
the preparation of squeezed states. Furthermore, due
to the looseness of the current best entropic uncertainty
relations, this approach predicts key rates that are pes-
simistic as a function of loss.
The no-switching CV-QKD protocol acting on 2n-
mode state shared between Alice and Bob is ǫ-secure
against collective attacks in a reverse reconciliation (RR)
scenario if ǫ=2ǫsm+ǫ¯+ǫPE+ǫcor [24, 28] and if the key
length ℓ is chosen such that [24, 28]
ℓ≤N [βI(A:B)−χ(B:E)]−∆AEP−2 log2( 12ǫ¯ ), (1)
where I(A:B) is the Shannon mutual informa-
tion between Alice and Bob (calculated and pro-
vided in Appendix. B), χ(B:E) is the Holevo
mutual information between Eve and Bob, β
is the reconciliation efficiency, N=2n, ∆AEP =√
N [(d+1)2+4(d+1)
√
log2(2/ǫ
2
sm)+2 log2(2/(ǫ
2ǫsm))]+4ǫsmd/ǫ
[24, 28], and where d is the discretization parameter,
and ǫcor and ǫPE are the maximum failure probabilities
for the error correction and parameter estimation,
respectively (see Appendix. A for more details). We
have considered the same scenario as [24, 28, 29], where
almost all the raw data can be utilized to distill the
secret key. Note that for the ǫ-security analysis of the
same protocol against individual attacks we can still use
Eq. (1), where χ(B:E) must be replaced by the Shannon
mutual information between Eve and Bob, I(B:E).
Optimal realistic attack. Now we investigate the op-
timal eavesdropping attack on a no-switching CV-QKD
protocol, given Eve’s storage and processing limitations.
We propose an optimal realistic hybrid attack, where Eve
performs a combination of both the coherent and indi-
vidual attacks. Note that Eve does not need a quantum
memory for the individual attack, since she does not need
to wait for any basis information to be disclosed in the
no-switching CV-QKD protocol. This hybrid attack al-
lows Eve to benefit from the advantage of both the col-
lective decoding, as well as the individual measurement
of the non-decohered ancillae. We model the coherent-
attack (individual-attack) part of the hybrid attack with
a Gaussian collective (individual) attack. Gaussian col-
lective (individual) attacks are known to be asymptot-
ically optimal [1, 2, 30–33]. Furthermore, according to
the Gaussian de Finetti reduction, for the no-switching
protocol it is also sufficient to consider Gaussian collec-
tive attacks in the finite-size, composable security proof
[6]. These results are crucial since they allow us to explic-
itly model Eve’s attack and her decoherence. Both the
3optimal Gaussian collective attack [34] and the optimal
Gaussian individual attack [35] can be modelled using an
entangling cloner attack (shown in Fig. 1), where Eve re-
places the Gaussian channel with transmissivity T and
excess noise ξ by a TMSV state ρE01E2 of the quadrature
variance ωE=1+Tξ/(1−T ), and a beam splitter of trans-
missivity T . Half of the TMSV state, mode E01 , is mixed
with the state sent by Alice in the beam splitter, out-
putting mode B1 (which is sent to Bob through a perfect
quantum channel) and Eve’s ancillary, mode E1.
In order to combine both the Gaussian collective attack
and the Gaussian individual attack in a hybrid attack, we
exploit two beam splitters with identical transmissivities
µ to split each of Eve’s ancillary modes into two output
modes, one for the collective attack and the other one for
the individual attack. In fact, the output mode E1 (E2)
is split in a beam splitter of transmissivity µ into two out-
put modes Ec1 (E
c
2) for the collective attack and E
i
1 (E
i
2)
for the individual attack. The ancillary modes Ec1 and
Ec2 are stored into Eve’s quantum memories, and collec-
tively measured after the entire ancillae are stored. Since
we are modelling Gaussian attacks, we model the total
decoherence induced during the collective attack over the
storage and processing time by a thermal, lossy Gaussian
channel with transmissivity τ and thermal noise variance
ω. Explicitly, the ancillary mode Ec1 (E
c
2) undergoes the
decoherence, modelled by a Gaussian channel with pa-
rameters τ1, ω1 (τ2, ω2), and the output mode E
′
1 (E
′
2).
Note that the output modes D1 and D2 are not accessi-
ble to Eve. On the other hand, in the individual attack,
the ancillary modes Ei1 and E
i
2 are mixed in a balanced
beam splitter resulting in modes E′′1 and E
′′
2 , where the
qˆ quadrature (the pˆ quadrature) is measured using the
homodyne detection on E′′1 (E
′′
2 ) [35, 36].
Security analysis against the hybrid attack. The
finite-size key length of the no switching protocol in the
RR scenario which is secure against the hybrid attack
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FIG. 1. Eve’s optimal hybrid attack for the no-switching CV-
QKD protocol.
with the security parameter ǫ˜ can be given as
ℓhyb≤min
µ
[NβI(A:B)−NIhybµ (B:E)−∆HAEP−2 log2( 12ǫ¯ )],
(2)
where Ihybµ (B:E) is the upper bound on the mutual in-
formation between Eve and Bob, which is given by
Ihybµ (B:E) = I
hyb
µ (B:E
′
1E
′
2E
′′
1E
′′
2 ) =
χµ(BE
′′
1E
′′
2 :E
′
1E
′
2) + Iµ(B:E
′′
1E
′′
2 )− χµ(E′′1E′′2 :E′1E′2),
(3)
where χµ(BE
′′
1E
′′
2 :E
′
1E
′
2) is Eve’s information con-
tributed from the collective attack, limited by the Holevo
bound, Iµ(B:E
′′
1E
′′
2 ) is Eve’s information contributed
from the individual attack, limited by the Shannon
bound, and χµ(E
′′
1E
′′
2 :E
′
1E
′
2) is the mutual information
between Eve’s ancillary modes for the individual and col-
lective attacks, limited by the Holevo bound. See Ap-
pendix. C for the calculation of the right-hand terms of
Eq. (3).
Since ∆-term in Eq. (2) is different for the coherent
and individual attacks, to compute ℓhyb in Eq. (2) we first
maximise Ihybµ (B:E) over all possible values of 0≤µ≤1.
When the maximization of Ihybµ (B:E) leads to µ=1, Eve’s
hybrid attack reduces to the coherent attack. In this case,
Eq. (2) changes to ℓhyb=ℓcoh, where
ℓcoh≤N [βI(A:B)−χ(B:E′1E′2)]−∆CAEP−2 log2( 12ǫ¯ ),
(4)
and where χ(B:E′1E
′
2)=χµ(BE
′′
1E
′′
2 :E
′
1E
′
2) for µ=1, and
∆CAEP is given by ∆AEP in Eq. (1) for ǫ≪ǫ˜. When the
maximization of Ihybµ (B:E) leads to µ=0, Eve’s hybrid
attack always reduces to the individual attack in the
asymptotic regime. However, it is not the case for the
finite-size regime, since ∆-term for the coherent attack
is much larger than that of the individual attack. This
is because the ∆-term for the individual attack does not
have to include the O(n4) reduction in ǫ˜ that is required
to reduce coherent attacks to collective ones. This means
there are instances where, although the coherent attack
results in a smaller mutual information with Eve (which
we would associate with a higher asymptotic key rate),
the coherent-attack finite key rate is still lower than the
individual-attack finite key rate because of this differ-
ence in the finite-size corrections. Hence, when the max-
imization of Ihybµ (B:E) leads to µ=0, the finite-size key
length is obtained by ℓhyb=min(ℓcoh,ℓind), where ℓind is
the finite-size key length where Eve’s hybrid attack re-
duces to the individual attack, and is given by
ℓind≤N [βI(A:B)−I(B:E′′1E′′2 )]−∆IAEP−2 log2( 12ǫ¯ ),
(5)
and where I(B:E′′1E
′′
2 )=Iµ(B:E
′′
1E
′′
2 ) for µ=0, and ∆
I
AEP
is given by ∆AEP in Eq. (1) for ǫ=ǫ˜. Furthermore, when
the maximization of Ihybµ (B:E) leads to 0<µ<1, Eve per-
forms a combination of both the individual and coherent
attacks. In this case we can only calculate a (presum-
ably loose) lower bound on the finite-size key length ℓhyb.
4Since ǫ≪ǫ˜ leads to ∆CAEP>∆IAEP, the (loose) lower bound
on ℓhyb can be obtained by Eq. (2) where ∆
H
AEP=∆
C
AEP.
Numerical results. We illustrate these results with a
practical example of realistic devices [37, 38] and a lossy
channel with transmissivity T = 0.1 (or approximately
50km of telecom fibre) and ξ = 0.01. In Fig. 2 the asymp-
totic and finite-size key rate of the no-switching protocol
in the RR scenario is illustrated as a function of Eve’s
memory-channel transmissivity for different types of at-
tacks; individual, coherent, and hybrid attacks. In the
asymptotic regime the secret key rate in the RR scenario
is given by Kind=βI(A:B)−I(B:E′′1E′′2 ) against the in-
dividual attack, Kcol=βI(A:B)−χ(B:E′1E′2) against the
collective attack, and Khyb=βI(A:B)−max
µ
[Ihybµ (B:E)]
against the hybrid attack. Note that the derived bounds
for the secret key rate in the case of collective attacks
remain asymptotically valid for the arbitrary coherent
attacks [33]. In the finite-size regime the secret key rate
in the RR scenario is given by Kind=
ℓind
N against the in-
dividual attack, Kcoh=
ℓcoh
N against the coherent attack,
and Khyb=
ℓhyb
N against the hybrid attack. For all types
of attacks the finite-size key is secure with the security
parameter ǫ˜=10−6 for n=109. Recall again that to anal-
yse the security of the no-switching protocol against co-
herent attacks with the security parameter ǫ˜=10−6, it is
sufficient to analyse the security of the protocol against
Gaussian collective attacks with the security parameter ǫ
using Eq. (4) where ǫ≪ ǫ˜. Here we consider ǫ=10−42 for
n=109 and ǫ˜=10−6, since the security loss due to the re-
duction from coherent attacks to collective attacks scales
like O(n4). In Fig. 2 we assume identical (i.e. τ1=τ2=τ
and ω1=ω2=ω) but independent quantum memories.
In Fig. 2 we see that there is a threshold transmis-
sivity of Eve’s memory channel below which an individ-
ual attack is always optimal. We denote τasc and τ
fs
c
for the threshold transmissivity in the asymptotic and
finite-size regime respectively. Asymptotically we see
that when τ≤τasc =0.17 individual attacks are optimal,
for τasc <τ≤0.72 Eve’s optimal strategy is a hybrid com-
bination of both individual and coherent attacks, and
for τ>0.72 coherent attacks are optimal. In the finite-
size case when τ≤τ fsc =0.23 individual attacks are opti-
mal, and for τ>τ fsc (where hybrid attacks are optimal for
τ fsc <τ≤0.7, and coherent attacks are optimal for τ>0.7)
positive finite key rate cannot be generated. Note that
in the presence of memory’s thermal noise (i.e. ω>1) the
threshold transmissivity becomes higher than that in the
case of Eve’s pure-loss quantum memory (i.e. ω=1). See
Appendix. D for the numerical results on low-loss chan-
nels as well as direct reconciliation scenario.
Thus, we find that our analysis can translate a model
for the decoherence of Eve’s attack into a rigorous, quan-
tifiable bound on performance. This fact results in a re-
markable improvement of the key rate up to that achiev-
able under the assumption of individual attacks. For a
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Memory's Transmissivity ( )
10-2
10-1
100
101
K
ey
 R
at
e
Coherent-Asymptotic
Individual-Asymptotic
Hybrid-Asymptotic
Coherent-Finite
Individual-Finite
Hybrid-Finite
c
as
c
fs
FIG. 2. The finite-size and asymptotic key rate as a function
of memory’s transmissivity, τ , for individual (blue), coherent
(red), and hybrid attacks (black). The numerical values are
η=0.6 [37], υel=0.015 [38], T=0.1, ξ=0.01, d=5, ω=1, β=0.98
[39], and the modulation variance is optimized. The region
marked by the ellipse shows memory’s transmissivities for
which Eve’s optimal attack is the individual attack.
Gaussian-channel model we generically find a threshold
value for the overall decoherence of Eve’s attack above
which the mutual information between Bob and Eve is
degraded so severely that Eve is forced to make an indi-
vidual attack. These results are of significant practical
relevance. For instance, Fig. 2 shows that while positive
finite key rates cannot be generated under the unrealis-
tic assumption of perfect coherent attacks, by considering
Eve’s attack decoherence we are able to move from inse-
cure regime to secure regime, and generate non-trivial
positive finite key rates. Fig. 3 also shows the advan-
tage of individual attacks over perfect coherent attacks
in terms of the maximum secure transmission distance
of the CV-QKD protocol, where this advantage is signif-
icant, especially in the finite-size regime.
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FIG. 3. The finite-size and asymptotic key rate as a function
of channel distance (with the assumption of 0.2dB loss per
kilometer) for individual (blue) and perfect coherent attacks
(red). The numerical values are the same as Fig. 2.
5Discussion. In our model of restricted attack we make
no assumption on the size of Eve’s quantum memory. In
fact, we assume a less restricted assumption on Eve’s
storage ability where she is able to store all the ancillary
modes. However, we assume any mode stored into the
memory undergoes the same amount of decoherence. It
could also be reasonable to consider a bounded memory,
where only a small fraction of the total modes can be
stored, and the rest of them are only individually mea-
sured. Further, it would be more realistic to consider dif-
ferent amounts of decoherence for Eve’s stored ancillary
modes, as some of them are stored in the memory longer
than others. Finally, it would be desirable to extend
this result to the other Gaussian CV-QKD protocols, al-
though this would require solving the open problem of
explicitly identifying the corresponding optimal attacks.
Conclusion. Given the realistic restriction that in a
coherent (or collective) attack, Eve’s quantum system un-
dergoes a certain amount of decoherence over the stor-
age and processing time, we found that there is always a
threshold for Eve’s decoherence, above which Eve’s best
strategy is limited to individual attacks. Since the deco-
herence is an increasing function of the storage time, if
Eve’s required time to store the entire ensemble and per-
form a collective measurement on the stored ensemble is
sufficiently long, the security analysis of the protocol re-
duces to that of individual attacks, which substantially
improves the key rate and the secure transmission dis-
tance of the CV-QKD protocol.
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Appendix A: Composable finite-size security analysis
In the finite-size security analysis the key is proved
to be secure against Eve’s attacks up to a small failure
probability, while in the asymptotic security analysis the
key is proved to be perfectly secure in the limit of infinite
quantum states distributed between Alice and Bob.
The security of a quantum key distribution (QKD)
protocol against general attacks is established by prov-
ing that the real protocol is approximately equal to an
ideal protocol. We first introduce the properties an ideal
protocol is required to achieve, correctness, secrecy, and
robustness. Note that an entanglement-based QKD pro-
tocol can be described as a completely positive trace-
preserving map that takes an input state ρAB, and out-
puts a key consisting of two classical strings SA and SB
on Alice’s and Bob’s side, respectively. The protocol
is correct when SA = SB. The resultant key is secret
when SA is uniformly distributed and is uncorrelated
with Eve’s system. A protocol is called secure if it is
both correct and secret. The protocol is robust if it never
aborts when Eve is passive (i.e., Eve does not disturb the
quantum channel) [24, 25].
However, for a real protocol we can only hope to
achieve an almost ideal protocol up to small failure prob-
abilities ǫcor and ǫsec. The protocol is ǫcor-correct when
Pr[SA 6= SB] ≤ ǫcor. The protocol is ǫsec-secret when
the key is δ-close in trace distance to a uniformly dis-
tributed key that is uncorrelated with Eve’s system, i.e.,
1
2 ‖ρSAE′ − τSA ⊗ ρE′‖ ≤ δ, and (1 − pabort)δ ≤ ǫsec,
where ‖.‖ is the trace norm, and pabort is the probability
to abort. In this definition τSA is the uniform (i.e. fully
mixed) state over SA, ρE′ are states on Eve’s system E
′
(which characterizes Eve’s quantum states E, as well as
the public classical information C leaked during the QKD
protocol), and ρSAE′ =
∑
s
|s〉 〈s|⊗ρE′ is a classical quan-
tum state describing the state of SA and Eve’s system
E′ [24, 25]. A QKD protocol is called ǫ-secure when it
is ǫcor-correct and ǫsec-secret with ǫcor+ ǫsec ≤ ǫ [24, 25].
Note that this security definition also ensures that the
QKD protocol is secure in the framework of composable
security [24, 25], in which different cryptographic proto-
cols can be combined without compromising the overall
security.
Let us consider the equivalent entanglement-based
scheme of a no-switching continuous-variable (CV) QKD
protocol [4, 5] in the reverse reconciliation scheme where
Alice preparesN = 2n two-mode squeezed vacuum states
with the quadrature variance V , keeps the first mode of
each state, while sending the second mode to Bob over
an insecure quantum channel with transmissivity T and
excess noise ξ (relative to the input of the quantum chan-
nel). Alice and Bob measure their own modes with het-
erodyne detection to obtain two strings, X ∈ R4n and
Y ∈ R4n. Bob discretizes his string by dividing the con-
tinuous range of his quadrature variables Y into 2d in-
tervals I1, ..., I2d of the normal distribution, where d is
the discretization parameter. Bob applies the discretiza-
tion map D : Y → U , such that D(Yk) = j if Yk ∈ Ij
[24]. As a result of the discretization Bob ends up with
the m = 4dn-bit string U , where each symbol is encoded
with d bits of precision.
Here, similar to [24] we assume parameter estimation
can be performed after the reconciliation (or error cor-
rection). This assumption leads to the improvement of
parameter estimation and enables us to use almost all
the raw data to distill the secret key. In the error correc-
tion step based on a linear error-correcting code agreed
on in advance Bob sends the syndrome of his vector U
of size lEC to Alice, who outputs an estimate Uˆ of U . In
order to know whether the error correction passed (i.e.,
Uˆ = U), Alice and Bob compute a hash of their strings Uˆ
and U , respectively. Bob then reveals his hash to Alice.
If both hashes coincide, the protocol proceeds, otherwise
it aborts. Note that the syndrome of size lEC contributes
to most of the leakage during the error correction. In the
parameter estimation which is performed after the error
correction, Bob sends only a few additional bits of infor-
mation to Alice that allow her to compute the covariance
matrix of the state ρ
⊗(2n)
AB as well as a confidence region
for the covariance matrix (for a detailed discussion on
the parameter estimation and how Alice and Bob know
the parameter estimation passed see [24]). We indicate
the maximum failure probabilities for the error correction
and parameter estimation steps with ǫcor and ǫPE. In the
privacy amplification step Alice and Bob apply a random
universal2 hash function to their respective strings, to ex-
tract two strings SA and SB of size ℓ.
Based on the Leftover Hash Lemma [40, 41] the key of
size ℓ is ǫsec-secret provided that ℓ is slightly smaller than
the smooth min-entropy of Bob’s string U conditioned
on Eve’s system E′, Hǫsmmin(U
m|E′) [40], where m indi-
cates the length of the string U , and ǫsm is the smooth-
ing parameter which is dependent on the value of ǫsec
1.
The conditional smooth min-entropy Hǫsmmin(U
m|E′) char-
acterizes Eve’s uncertainty (or lack of knowledge) about
Bob’s string U . Note that the chain rule for the smooth
min-entropy [24] gives Hǫsmmin(U
m|E′) = Hǫsmmin(Um|EC) ≥
Hǫsmmin(U
m|E)− log2 |C|, where log2 |C| = lEC.
In order to calculate the length ℓ of the final key
which is ǫ-secure, the conditional smooth min-entropy
Hǫsmmin(U
m|E) has to be lower bounded when the pro-
1 In fact, the ǫsm-smooth min-entropy of Bob’s string U condi-
tioned on Eve’s system characterizes that given Eve’s system how
much ǫsm-close to uniform randomness (which is uncorrelated
with Eve’s system) can be extracted from the random variable
U .
8tocol did not abort, but this is usually a hard task.
However, under the assumption of individual and collec-
tive attacks (meaning that every signal sent from Alice
to Bob is attacked with the same quantum operation),
where the state between Alice, Bob, and Eve has a ten-
sor product structure, we can employ the Asymptotic
Equipartition property [24, 42, 43], and provide a bound
in terms of von Neumann entropy. This property states
that for large N , the conditional smooth min-entropy ap-
proaches the conditional von Neumann entropy. Explic-
itly, we have Hǫsmmin(U
m |E ) ≥ H(Um |E ) − ∆AEP [24],
where H(Um |E) is the conditional von Neumann en-
tropy, and ∆AEP =
√
N [(d+1)2+4(d+1)
√
log2(2/ǫ
2
sm)+
2 log2(2/(ǫ
2ǫsm))]+4ǫsmd/ǫ [24, 28]. The conditional von
Neumann entropy H(Um |E) is given by H(Um|E) =
NH(U)−N χ(U :E), where H(U) is Bob’s Shannon en-
tropy, and χ(U :E) is the Holevo mutual information be-
tween Eve and Bob for collective attacks. Note that for
individual attacks χ(U :E) must be replaced by the Shan-
non mutual information between Eve and Bob, I(U :E).
According to the security theorem proved in [24, 28]
the no-switching CV-QKD protocol is ǫ-secure against
collective attacks if 2
ǫ = 2ǫsm + ǫ¯+ ǫPE + ǫcor, (A1)
and if the key length ℓ is chosen such that 3
ℓ ≤ N [H(U)− χ(U :E)]− lEC −∆AEP − 2 log2( 12ǫ¯).
(A2)
Considering that the leakage during the error correction
is given by lEC = N [H(U)−βI(A:B)] [24, 25, 28], where
I(A:B) is the Shannon mutual information between Alice
and Bob, we can rewrite Eq. (A2) as
ℓ ≤ N [βI(A:B)− χ(U :E)]−∆AEP − 2 log2( 12ǫ¯ ), (A3)
where χ(U :E) is upper bounded by χ(Y :E) = χ(B:E),
since the discretization algorithm cannot increase the
2 Note that terms here are slightly different to [24] because, as
pointed out in [28], they are unnecessarily pessimistic on two
counts. First, in Theorem 1 of Supplementary Information of
[24], the terms ǫPE and ǫcor are both divided by p (the unknown
passing probability of the protocol) which is subsequently lower
bounded by ǫ, the overall collective security parameter. This
is unnecessarily pessimistic and stems from substituting the un-
conditional failure probability for parameter estimation and error
correction which are indeed ǫPE/p and ǫcor/p respectively. How-
ever, the quantity in Eq. (A1) is conditioned upon passing the
test, therefore the terms should be multiplied by p, which can-
cels. Secondly, in [24] an extra step is introduced to bound the
Shannon entropy appearing in Eq. (A2) by the so-called empir-
ical entropy. This leads to an extra correction term in Eq. (A2)
and an extra failure probability in Eq. (A1). However, neither
of these are necessary since the term NH(U) − lEC is directly
measured in an experiment. Therefore it does not need to be
rigorously bounded by the empirical entropy but can instead be
modelled for the purposes of plotting the expected key rate by
NβI(A:B).
3 Note that ǫ¯ comes from the Leftover Hash Lemma [24].
mutual information. According to [24] the Holevo infor-
mation χ(B:E) can be calculated based on a covariance
matrix Mab = [
∑max
a I,
∑min
c Z;
∑min
c Z,
∑max
b I] with I
a 2× 2 identity matrix, and Z = diag (1,−1), where the
elements of Mab provide a bound on the elements of the
covariance matrix of the state shared between Alice and
Bob:
∑max
a =
1
2n
[
1 + 2
√
log(36/ǫPE)
n
]
‖X‖2 − 1,
∑max
b =
1
2n
[
1 + 2
√
log(36/ǫPE)
n
]
‖Y ‖2 − 1,
∑min
c =
1
2n 〈X,Y 〉 − 5
√
log(8/ǫPE)
n3
(
‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2
)
,
(A4)
where ‖X‖2, ‖Y ‖2, 〈X,Y 〉 can be achieved by taking val-
ues differing by 3 standard deviations from the expected
values [24] (for an expected Gaussian channel with pa-
rameters T and ξ). It is then assumed Eve’s information
can be upper bounded by calculating χ(B:E) based on
the covariance matrix Mab, except with the probability
of ǫPE.
The final key rate where the key is ǫ-secure against col-
lective attacks is given by ℓ/N . We recall that in Eq. (A3)
we have considered the same scenario as [24], where al-
most all the raw data can be utilized to distill the secret
key4 (by performing the parameter estimation after the
error correction). However, if the parameter estimation
is performed before the error correction, Alice and Bob
are required to disclose non-negligible bits of information,
NPE, during the parameter estimation, which means N
′
bits of information is used for the key extraction, where
N ′ = N −NPE. As a result, the final secure key rate is
given by ℓ/N , where ℓ is given by Eq. (A3), but now N
in Eq. (A3) has to be replaced by N ′.
In order to prove the security of the no-switching CV-
QKD protocol against coherent attacks we apply the
Gaussian de Finetti reduction technique [6]. In order
to apply this technique we need to truncate the Hilbert
space in a suitable manner. This can be achieved with
the help of an energy test [6], which ensures that the state
shared between Alice and Bob is suitably described by as-
signing a low-dimensional Hilbert space. Considering the
input state is a (2n+k)-mode state, Alice and Bob should
symmetrize this state and measure the last k modes with
heterodyne detection. If the average energy per mode is
below dA for Alice and dB for Bob, the energy test passes
4 Note that it has been recently shown in [29] that in CV-QKD
the whole raw keys can be used for both parameter estimation
and secret key generation, without compromising the security,
and without any requirements of doing error correction before
parameter estimation.
9and Alice and Bob apply the CV-QKD to their remain-
ing modes, otherwise the protocol aborts. The thresholds
dA and dB should be chosen properly to ensure that the
energy test passes with large success probability.
According to the security theorem proved in [6], if we
are given a no-switching CV-QKD protocol acting on
2n-mode state shared between Alice and Bob (which is
suitably symmetrized), such that the protocol is ǫ-secure
against Gaussian collective attacks, the modified protocol
including an energy test and an additional privacy ampli-
fication step [6] is ǫ˜-secure against coherent attacks, with
ǫ˜ = (K4/50)ǫ where
K = max
[
1, n(dA + dB)
(
1 + 2
√
[(ln(8/ǫ))/2n]
+ (ln(8/ǫ))/n)
(
1− 2
√
[(ln(8/ǫ))/2k]
)−1]
.
(A5)
Thus, the security loss due to the reduction from coherent
attacks to collective attacks scales like O(n4).
Note that in our numerical calculations of finite-size
key rate we consider the security parameter of ǫ˜ = 10−6
for all types of attacks. Thus, we choose ǫPE = ǫcor =
ǫ¯ = 10−7 for individual attacks to satisfy Eq. (A1) for
ǫ = ǫ˜. For coherent attacks (which are modelled by
Gaussian collective attacks with far smaller security pa-
rameter ǫ = 10−42 ≪ ǫ˜ = 10−6 for n = 109) we choose
ǫPE = ǫcor = ǫ¯ = 10
−43 to satisfy Eq. (A1). However,
for hybrid attacks we consider a pessimistic scenario by
choosing ǫPE = ǫcor = ǫ¯ = 10
−43, which again leads to a
loose lower bound on the finite-size hybrid key rate.
Note also that in our numerical calculations of finite-
size key rate we do not use directly the covariance matrix
shared between Alice and Bob given by Mab to compute
the key rate. More specifically, we first calculate the ma-
trix Mab, and then estimate the required parameters (T ,
ξ, and V ) from the elements of the matrixMab, and then
proceed to compute the key rate based on the calculations
provided in the next sections.
Appendix B: Calculation of I(A : B)
In the entanglement-based scheme of the no-switching
CV-QKD protocol the initial pure Gaussian entangled
state ρAB with the quadrature variance V is completely
described by its first moment, which is zero, and its co-
variance matrix,
MAB =
[
V I
√
V 2 − 1Z√
V 2 − 1Z V I
]
. (A6)
After transmission of mode B through a quantum chan-
nel with transmissivity T and excess noise ξ, the covari-
ance matrix of the mixed state ρAB1 at the output of the
channel is given by
MAB1 =
[
V I
√
T
√
V 2 − 1Z√
T
√
V 2 − 1Z (T (V + χline)) I
]
, (A7)
where χline = ξ +
1
T − 1. At the output of the channel
Bob applies heterodyne detection to mode B1. Bob’s
heterodyne detector with efficiency of η and electronic
noise variance of υel can be modeled by placing a beam
splitter of transmissivity η before an ideal heterodyne
detector [22, 23]. The heterodyne detector’s electronic
noise can be modelled by a two-mode squeezed vacuum
state, ρF0G, of quadrature variance υ, where υ = 1 +
2υel/(1 − η). One input port of the beam splitter is the
received mode B1, and the second input port is fed by
one half of the entangled state ρF0G, mode F0, while the
output ports are mode B2 (which is measured by the
ideal heterodyne detector) and mode F .
The Shannon mutual information between Alice and
Bob, I(A : B), is given by I(A : B) = log2
V
Bhet
2
V
B2
het|Ahet
,
where VBhet2 is the variance of heterodyne-detected mode
B2, and is given by VBhet2 = ηT (V + χtot)/2, where
χtot = χline +
χhet
T , and where χhet = [1 + (1 − η) +
2υel]/η. The conditional variance VB2het|Ahet is the vari-
ance of heterodyne-detected mode B2 conditioned on Al-
ice’s heterodyne detection of mode A, which is given by
VB2het|Ahet = ηT (1 + χtot)/2.
Appendix C: Calculation of Ihybµ (B : E)
The upper bound on the mutual information between
Eve and Bob in the hybrid attack, Ihybµ (B : E), is given
by
Ihybµ (B : E) = I
hyb
µ (B : E
′
1E
′
2E
′′
1E
′′
2 ) =
χµ(BE
′′
1E
′′
2 : E
′
1E
′
2) + Iµ(B : E
′′
1E
′′
2 )− χµ(E′′1E′′2 : E′1E′2).
(A8)
We now analyse the calculation of the mutual information
terms on the right-hand-side of Eq. (A8):
1. Calculation of χµ(BE
′′
1E
′′
2 : E
′
1E
′
2)
In Eq. (A8) the Holevo mutual information
χµ(BE
′′
1E
′′
2 : E
′
1E
′
2) is given by χµ(BE
′′
1E
′′
2 : E
′
1E
′
2) =
S(ρE′1E′2) − S(ρE′2E′2|E′′1 E′′2 B2), where S(ρ) is the von
Neumann entropy5 of the state ρ. Note that here we
5 The von Neumann entropy of an n-mode Gaussian state ρ with
the covariance matrix M is given by S(ρ) =
∑
n
i=1
G(λi−1
2
),
where λi are the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix
M, and G(x) = (x+ 1)log2(x+ 1)− xlog2(x).
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assume Bob’s detection noise is not accessible to Eve.
The first entropy S(ρE′1E′2) is calculated through the
symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix ME′
1
E′
2
,
which is given by
ME′1E
′
2
=
[ [
τ1VEc1 + (1− τ1)ω1
]
I
√
τ1τ2CEc1,Ec2Z√
τ1τ2CEc1 ,Ec2Z
[
τ2VEc2 + (1− τ2)ω2
]
I
]
,
(A9)
where VEc
1
= µVE1 + (1− µ), VEc2 = µVE2 + (1− µ), and
CEc1,Ec2 = µCE1,E2 . Note that VE1 = TωE + (1 − T )V ,
VE2 = ωE , and CE1,E2 =
√
T
√
ω2E − 1.
The second entropy we require in order to determine
χµ(BE
′′
1E
′′
2 : E
′
1E
′
2) is S(ρE′2E′2|E′′1 E′′2 B2) which is cal-
culated through the symplectic eigenvalues of the con-
ditional covariance matrix ME′1E′2|E′′1 E′′2 B2 . This condi-
tional covariance matrix is actually the covariance matrix
of modes E′1E
′
2 conditioned on the homodyne detection
of modes E′′1E
′′
2 and heterodyne detection of mode B2.
Let us recall that the heterodyne detection of mode B2
is the combination of mode B2 with a vacuum mode in
a balanced beam splitter, which outputs mode B3 and
mode C, where the qˆ (pˆ) quadrature is measured on
mode B3 (mode C) using a homodyne detector. Hence,
the heterodyne detection on mode B2 is actually a con-
jugate homodyne detection on modes B3 and C. In this
case we have ME′1E′2|E′′1 E′′2B2 = ME′1E′2|E′′1 E′′2 B3C , where
we have
ME′1E
′
2|E′′1 E′′2B3C =
ME′
1
E′
2
− σE′
1
E′
2
,E′′
1
E′′
2
B3C Hhom σ
T
E′1E
′
2,E
′′
1 E
′′
2 B3C
.
(A10)
In Eq. (A10) the covariance matrix ME′1E′2 is given by
Eq. (A9), and the matrix σE′
1
E′
2
,E′′
1
E′′
2
B3C is given by
σE′1E
′
2,E
′′
1 E
′′
2B3C
=
[
σE′1E
′
2,E
′′
1 E
′′
2
σE′1E
′
2,B3
σE′1E
′
2,C
]
.
(A11)
In Eq. (A11) the matrix σE′
1
E′
2
,E′′
1
E′′
2
is given by
σE′
1
E′
2
,E′′
1
E′′
2
=


Cq
E′
1
,q
E′′
1
0 Cq
E′
1
,q
E′′
2
0
0 Cp
E′
1
,p
E′′
1
0 Cp
E′
1
,p
E′′
2
Cq
E′
2
,q
E′′
1
0 Cq
E′
2
,q
E′′
2
0
0 Cp
E′
2
,p
E′′
1
0 Cp
E′
2
,p
E′′
2

 .
(A12)
In Eq. (A12) we have Cq
E′
1
,q
E′′
1
= Cp
E′
1
,p
E′′
2
=
(CEi1,E′1−CEi2,E′1)/
√
2, Cp
E′
1
,p
E′′
1
= Cq
E′
1
,q
E′′
2
= (CEi1,E′1 +
CEi2,E′1)/
√
2, Cq
E′
2
,q
E′′
2
= −Cp
E′
2
,p
E′′
1
= (CEi1,E′2 +
CEi2,E′2)/
√
2, and Cp
E′
2
,p
E′′
2
= −Cq
E′
2
,q
E′′
1
= (−CEi1,E′2 +
CEi2,E′2)/
√
2, and where
CEi1,E′1 =
√
τ1(1 − µ)µ(1− VE1),
CEi2,E′1 = −
√
τ1(1− µ)µCE1,E2 ,
CEi1,E′2 = −
√
τ2(1− µ)µCE1,E2 ,
CEi2,E′2 =
√
τ2(1 − µ)µ(1− VE2).
(A13)
In Eq. (A11) the matrices σE′
1
E′
2
,B3 and σE′1E′2,C are
given by σE′
1
E′
2
,B3 = −σE′1E′2,C = 1√2σE′1E′2,B2 , where
we have
σE′1E
′
2,B2
=
[ √
τ1µ(1 − T )Tη (ωE − V ) I√
τ2µ(1− T )η
√
ω2E − 1Z
]
. (A14)
In Eq. (A10) the matrix Hhom is given by Hhom =
(XME′′
1
E′′
2
B3CX)
MP, where X = diag(1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1),
MP stands for the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of a ma-
trix, and the covariance matrix ME′′
1
E′′
2
B3C is given by
ME′′
1
E′′
2
B3C =

 ME′′1 E′′2 σTB3,E′′1 E′′2 σTC,E′′1 E′′2
σB3,E′′1 E
′′
2
MB3 σ
T
C,B3
σC,E′′
1
E′′
2
σC,B3 MC

 .
(A15)
In Eq. (A15) the covariance matrix ME′′1 E′′2 is given by
ME′′1 E
′′
2
=


Vq
E′′
1
0 Cq
E′′
1
,q
E′′
2
0
0 Vp
E′′
1
0 Cp
E′′
1
,p
E′′
2
Cq
E′′
1
,q
E′′
2
0 Vq
E′′
2
0
0 Cp
E′′
1
,p
E′′
2
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(A16)
where Vq
E′′
1
= Vp
E′′
2
= (VEi1 + VEi2)/2 − CEi1,Ei2 , VpE′′1 =
Vq
E′′
2
= (VEi1 + VEi2)/2 + CEi1,Ei2 , and CqE′′1 ,qE′′2
=
Cp
E′′
1
,p
E′′
2
= (VEi1 − VEi2)/2, and where
VEi1 = (1− µ)VE1 + µ, VEi2 = (1− µ)VE2 + µ,
CEi1,Ei2 = (1 − µ)CE1,E2 .
(A17)
In Eq. (A15) the matrices σB3,E′′1 E′′2 and σC,E′′1 E′′2 are
given by σB3,E′′1 E′′2 = −σC,E′′1 E′′2 = 1√2σB2,E′′1 E′′2 , where
σB2,E′′1 E
′′
2
=
[
CqB2 ,qE′′
1
0 CqB2 ,qE′′
2
0
0 CpB2 ,pE′′
1
0 CpB2 ,pE′′
2
]
.
(A18)
In Eq. (A18) we have CqB2 ,qE′′1
= CpB2 ,pE′′2
= (CB2,Ei1 −
CB2,Ei2)/
√
2, and CpB2 ,pE′′1
= CqB2 ,qE′′2
= (CB2,Ei1 +
11
CB2,Ei2)/
√
2, and where
CB2,Ei1 =
√
(1− µ)(1 − T )Tη(V − ωE),
CB2,Ei2 = −
√
(1− µ)(1 − T )η
√
ω2E − 1.
(A19)
In Eq. (A15) we have MB3 = MC = 0.5(VB2 + 1)I, and
σC,B3 = 0.5(1 − VB2)I, where VB2 = ηT (V + χt) and
where χt = χline+
χD
T , and where χD = [(1−η)+2υel]/η.
2. Calculation of Iµ(B : E
′′
1E
′′
2 )
In Eq. (A8) the Shannon mutual information Iµ(B :
E′′1E
′′
2 ) is given by
Iµ(B : E
′′
1E
′′
2 ) =
1
2
log2
VBhet2
Vq
Bhet
2
|q
E′′
1
+
1
2
log2
VBhet2
Vp
Bhet
2
|p
E′′
2
,
(A20)
where the conditional variance Vq
Bhet
2
|q
E′′
1
is given
by Vq
Bhet
2
|q
E′′
1
=(VqB2 |qE′′1
+1)/2, and similarly for the
p quadrature we have Vp
Bhet
2
|p
E′′
2
=(VpB2 |pE′′2
+1)/2.
The symmetry of Eve’s information on qB2 and
pB2 imposes that VqB2 |qE′′1
=VpB2 |pE′′2
. Note that
VqB2 |qE′′1
=VqB2−CqB2 ,qE′′
1
/Vq
E′′
1
, where VqB2=ηT (V +χt).
Note also that VBhet2 , CqB2 ,qE′′1
, and Vq
E′′
1
have been al-
ready calculated and provided in the previous sections.
3. Calculation of χµ(E
′′
1E
′′
2 : E
′
1E
′
2)
In Eq. (A8) the Holevo information χµ(E
′′
1E
′′
2 :
E′1E
′
2) is given by χµ(E
′′
1E
′′
2 : E
′
1E
′
2) = S(ρE′1E′2) −
S(ρE′1E′2|E′′1 E′′2 ). The conditional entropy S(ρE′1E′2|E′′1 E′′2 )
is calculated through the symplectic eigenvalues of the
conditional covariance matrix ME′1E′2|E′′1 E′′2 . This con-
ditional covariance matrix is given by ME′1E′2|E′′1 E′′2 =
ME′1E
′
2
− σE′1E′2,E′′1 E′′2 Hihom σTE′1E′2,E′′1 E′′2 . The matrix
H
i
hom is given by H
i
hom = (XiME′′1 E′′2 Xi)
MP, where
Xi = diag(1, 0, 0, 1). Note that the matrices ME′1E′2 ,
σE′
1
E′
2
,E′′
1
E′′
2
, and ME′′
1
E′′
2
are given by Eqs. (A9), (A12),
and (A16), respectively.
Appendix D: Numerical results on low-loss channels
We repeat our numerical simulations for a low-loss
quantum channel in Fig. A1, which result in similar
trends to high-loss channels. Asymptotically we see that
when τ≤τasc =0.18 individual attacks are optimal, for
τasc <τ≤0.75 Eve’s optimal strategy is a hybrid combi-
nation of both individual and coherent attacks, and for
τ>0.75 coherent attacks are optimal. In the finite-size
case when τ≤τ fsc =0.26 individual attacks are optimal, for
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FIG. A1. The finite-size and asymptotic key rate as a function
of memory’s transmissivity, τ , for individual (blue), coherent
(red), and hybrid attacks (black). The numerical values are
η=0.6 [37], υel=0.015 [38], T=0.5, ξ=0.01, d=5, ω=1, β=0.98
[39], and the modulation variance is optimized. The region
marked by the ellipse shows memory’s transmissivities for
which Eve’s optimal attack is the individual attack.
τ fsc <τ≤0.89 Eve’s optimal strategy is a hybrid combina-
tion of both individual and coherent attacks (only a loose
lower bound on the finite-size hybrid key rate can be cal-
culated), and for τ>0.89 coherent attacks are optimal.
Note that in Fig. A1 the threshold transmissivity is dif-
ferent for the finite-size and asymptotic regime, since the
finite key rate is calculated based on the estimated values
of the channel, while the asymptotic key rate is calculated
based on the expected values of the channel.
Additional calculations beyond those illustrated here
have been carried out covering direct reconciliation (DR),
which result in similar trends to those indicated here.
However, DR is only successful when the channel loss is
below 3dB. For instance, in the DR scenario of the no-
switching protocol with the same parameters as Fig. A1,
individual attacks result in positive finite key rates only
for low-loss channels with T ≥ 0.72. Hence, if Eve’s
decoherence is large enough to make individual attacks
the optimal attacks, positive finite key rates can only be
generated for T ≥ 0.72.
